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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a unique view of modeling the diffusion of warnings in social networks where the network 
structure may change over time. Since the characteristics and actions of people in a community have significant 
influence on the flow of information through a network, we present an axiomatic framework for modeling the 
diffusion process through the concept of trust. This ongoing work provides a micro level view of the behavior of 
individuals and groups in a community. Preliminary experiments were made to explore how model parameters such 
as trust and the social network structure affect warning message belief and evacuation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the event of a natural disaster or technological hazard, it is important that warnings are disseminated effectively 
and efficiently through the affected population. In other events, warning messages may serve as a flag alerting the 
population of potential but not immediate danger. The assumption here is that given a warning, individuals will have 
some time to spread the warning and take the recommended action.  
Warning systems play an important role in notifying the population of the future danger and providing precautionary 
and safety information so that necessary actions can be taken. Even with the most detailed warning broadcast, the 
message might not reach the entire targeted audience. In addition, social and economic factors may hinder 
individuals to comply with the recommendations. It is essential to understand the social interactions and human 
behaviors involved in hazardous events in order to have a successful warning system. The notion of trust is an 
important component in these situations. The diffusion framework incorporates this concept of trust that quantifies 
the likelihood that individuals will believe the message being conveyed to them (Kelton et al., In Press, Kelton and 
Wallace, 2000, Kelton and Wallace, 2003). 
RELATED WORK 
Research on warning response behavior dates back about 40 years (Mileti, 1999). The overall conclusion is that 
warning is a social process where receiving a message sets into motion a complex set of social interactions that may 
or may not result in the population taking the desired protective action. The warning sequence process model 
(Sorensen, 2000, Sorensen and Mileti, 1987, Sorensen et al., 1987) posits that there are six phases extending from 
disseminating the warning to the protective action. Previous work has also involved analyzing the decision making 
process that occurs in response to environmental threats and dangerous events (Lindell and Prater, 2004, Perry and 
Lindell, 2003).  
People’s response to warnings is a function of social, economic, and demographic factors (Aguirre, 1994), including 
physical environment, population, technology, social relations, and culture (Ding, 2006, Golden and Adams, 2000, 
Lindell and Prater, 2007, Sorensen, 2003). Warning systems must consider people’s perception, interpretation, and 
reaction to the warnings. It requires significant knowledge of the local population, in terms of their demographics, 
societal culture, and past events that have occurred in the location. In studying warning systems, issues like message 
distortion, level of detail in the message, as well as interference with normal activities play an important part on the 
recipient’s analysis of their situation (Lindell and Prater, 2004, Lindell and Prater, 2007, Sorensen, 2000, Sorensen 
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and Mileti, 1987, Sorensen et al., 1987). Incomplete information leads to lower compliance with emergency 
recommendations (Perry and Lindell, 2003).  
The warning time distribution has two components: the official broadcast component and the information diffusion 
component. The broadcast component is easy to identify but there are many uncertainties relating to the diffusion 
component (Perry and Lindell, 2003, Rogers and Sorensen, 1991, Sorensen, 1992). There has been considerable 
research in estimating warning time distributions by modeling the warning network, however there are difficulties 
because the diffusion component is dynamic, depending on the social and demographic structure (Ding, 2006, 
Rogers and Sorensen, 1991, Sorensen and Mileti, 1987, Sorensen et al., 1987).  
By understanding the communication patterns and social network structure, information can be passed on more 
efficiently and effectively. This form of communication is crucial when dealing with hazardous situations, natural 
disasters, or other emergencies. Along with quick communication, warnings have to be communicated effectively so 
that the target audience would act upon receiving the message and take the necessary measures. Upon receiving a 
warning message, people, in general, do not panic but instead try to act based on their limited knowledge of the 
situation. People evaluate the message in terms of their own personal experiences and values. They seek additional 
information and confirmation through observation and direct contact (Mileti, 1999, Sorensen, 2000, Sorensen and 
Mileti, 1987, Sorensen et al., 1987). Furthermore, people do not necessarily react immediately when they receive a 
warning message. The time to action depends upon the situation, the type of warning, as well as other factors 
(Sorensen et al., 1987). 
The source of the message is an important factor. Warning messages may come from many sources, such as 
television, radio, or simply word of mouth. The message receiver may have a different value of trust for each source. 
If the message is very important, i.e. potential for saving a life, the message receiver will be more likely to be 
influenced by the message. The quality and the content of the message is also an important factor. People are more 
hesitant to comply with emergency measures when they are provided with incomplete information (Perry and 
Lindell, 2003). 
In certain situations, individuals may decide to leave the community after a certain time, when they feel it is 
necessary to leave. Therefore the social network is dynamic in the sense that when individuals leave, we assume that 
all connections to their neighbors are terminated, possibly disrupting future routes for additional messages. 
THE MODEL 
The agent-based model is based on an axiomatic foundation for studying the diffusion process in dynamic social 
networks. The social network described here is dynamic and in the case of evacuation warnings, when an individual 
node evacuates, the individual is removed from the network eliminating all its interaction edges, and perhaps 
disrupting the flow of information.  
The diffusion network defined here is comprised of three hierarchical layers. The bottom layer is the physical 
network. The physical layer represents all the possible forms of communication. In theory, the layer could be a 
complete graph in which each node has the potential ability to contact any other node in the network. The definition 
of the physical layer depends on the context of the model, for example, the geographical region being modeled. The 
second layer is the social network. The social layer is the layer where the diffusion of information occurs and is an 
induced sub graph of the physical layer. Lastly, the top layer is the interaction network. The interaction layer 
consists of a series of evolving graphs that are produced when information flows through the social network. 
Analyzing the evolving graphs in the interaction layer will provide insights into the diffusion process that occurs in 
the social network. 
Parameters 
Each node in the network represents a single entity, each with configurable attributes. These entities may be 
uninformed individuals or information sources. Source nodes initiate the original message. Once the message is 
initiated by a source, it carries along with it a source-value pair, storing the message source and information value.  
Types of nodes can be defined to introduce variety into the network population. These types can be used to represent 
subsets of the population that share similar traits, e.g. based on occupation. The trust values between types of 
individuals can be configured based on social relationships, e.g. in terms of kinship, affiliations, or authoritative 
power. The desired action consists of spreading the warning to their social contacts and making the decision to 
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perform protective action. There is a parameter to represent the evacuation preparation time, i.e. how much time 
elapses between the evacuation decision and its enactment.  
A source node is a specific type of node. It is defined to mimic the sources, such as television, radio, external family 
member, etc. The sources can broadcast messages with varying information value to represent the type of warning 
message, e.g. precautionary warning or high-risk alert. Each source has its own value of trust, which may be viewed 
differently by individuals. Their action is guaranteed in the sense that they introduce the initial message into the 
network. The source node may leave the network when the broadcast of the information is a one-time event or send 
messages in time intervals, e.g. sending news updates. The model assumes that the source nodes receive their 
information from resources outside of the network’s scope.  
The properties of the individual nodes are updated based on a set of defined axioms for the diffusion process. The 
weight on each interaction edge symbolizes the trust value between two individual nodes. Between two nodes in the 
network is a pair of directed edges with possibly two different weights, since trust does not have to be symmetric. 
Axioms 
The framework described here uses axioms to model the behavior of individuals as they receive and propagate 
information through the social network The individuals in the network diffuse information based on the following 
four axioms: Information Loss Axiom, Source Union Axiom, Value Min-Max Axiom, and Threshold Utility Axiom. 
Information Loss Axiom 
The Information Loss Axiom states that when a message is passed from one node to another, the information value 
of the message is non-increasing. The information value of the message at the receiver node is a function of the 
social relationship between the sender and the receiver, not just a function of distance.  
Source Union Axiom 
The Source Union Axiom states how source-value pairs are updated in a receiver node. The resulting source set 
should be a union of the source sets of the incoming messages. This ensures that messages from the same source are 
accounted for only once. 
Value Min-Max Axiom 
The Value Min-Max Axiom provides a method for computing the information value set for a receiver node. When a 
source is found in multiple messages, the combined information value for the source at the node is at least the 
maximum of the information values for this source over all the messages. Furthermore, the combined information 
value is at most the sum of all the information values of this source, but cannot exceed 1. The combined information 
value is scaled by a lambda parameter that determines where the value fall in the defined range, i.e. to what extent 
the information values are merged together.  
Threshold Utility Axiom 
The Threshold Utility Axiom is used to determine the states of the nodes. In this configuration, each individual node 
can be in one of four possible states. The following table summarizes the four basic states and defines the 
corresponding behavior. 
State Description  Behavior 
Uninformed  Individual has not received the message  No action 
Disbelieved  Individual does not believe the message  No action 
Undecided  Individual received the message and is 
uncertain of what to do 
Query  
Believed  Individual received the message and 
believes the value of the message 
Take necessary 
action  
Table 1. Node States 
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After computing new source sets and their corresponding information values, the receiver node will combine the 
values into a single information fused value. This value determines the state of the node. Each node has two defined 
threshold levels, a lower and upper bound, which determine the boundaries for when the node will acknowledge the 
message and/or take action.  
The Threshold Utility Axiom also states that the threshold level is a function of the utility of the message. In the 
case where the utility of the message is high, the individual is more likely to acknowledge the message but might be 
hesitant to take action (evacuate) immediately since there are high costs and consequences associated with this 
situation. Therefore, the lower bound threshold should be relatively low and the upper bound threshold should be 
somewhat high. On the contrary, if the utility of the message is rather low, both thresholds should be relatively low, 
since individuals may be more eager to take action (spread the message) since there are low costs and consequences 
to the action.  
SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
Preliminary experiments were made to explore how population demographics, trust and the social network structure 
affect evacuation. For the experiments, the social communication network was constructed an Erdos-Renyi graph 
with 600 nodes, where nodes are connected randomly with probability of 0.006. This resulted in an average of 3.6 
neighbors for each individual node and a total of 1102 edges. A network of 600 nodes seem sufficient based on past 
evacuation studies of hazardous events (Rogers et al., 1990, Vogt and Sorensen, 1999) that analyzed survey data sets 
in the scope of hundreds of households. The population is heterogeneous and consists of two equally sized groups of 
nodes, A and B. For simplicity, one source node was incorporated into the network. This source node was randomly 
connected to 60 nodes from group A and 60 nodes from group B. This source is assumed to be a trustworthy source 
with a very high information value (0.95). Individual nodes from either group have high trust in the source (0.90). In 
addition, it is assumed that this source would reach all its connected individual nodes when it sends the initial 
warning message. 
The two groups of nodes are identical in the sense of node characteristics, but the social relationships between them, 
namely, the trust values, are varied. The nodes have a lower bound threshold of 0.1, which suggests low tendency to 
disbelieve a warning message, and an upper bound of 0.5. Even though two individual nodes may be connected in 
the social network, it is possible that communication between them may not occur. To include this aspect, a 
probability of successful communication between two nodes is incorporated. In this case, there is a 75 percent 
probability that an individual node would be able to reach and propagate the message to its neighboring node. When 
an individual node enters the believer state, the node will propagate the message to its neighboring nodes and 
evacuate after 5 time steps.   
The following scenarios were modeled to incorporate heterogeneity in the degree of trust between nodes. These 
models are applicable, for example, multi-ethnic communities. In Scenario 1, the trust levels between all node types 
are equal (0.75). This represents a homogeneous network where everyone has the same trust in everyone else. In 
Scenario 2, individuals who belong to the same type have higher trust in each other. However, they have a lower 
level of trust in individuals of a different type. In Scenario 3, recipients have higher trust in senders who belong to 
one specific type, regardless of the recipient’s node type. Recipient nodes have high trust in senders from group A 
and low trust in senders from B. 
Scenarios  A to A  A to B  B to A  B to B 
Scenario 1  SAME  SAME  SAME  SAME 
Scenario  2  HIGH LOW LOW HIGH 
Scenario 3  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW 
Table 2.  Trust levels between node types 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results from the average of 10 replications are presented in Figure 1. The trust differential is referred to, as the 
difference between the high and low trust values. The network in Scenario 2 with trust differential 0.3 ended with 
the largest proportion of individuals evacuating. This observation suggests that tightly connected social communities 
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may be preferable in message diffusion. The homogenous network where trust values between all individual nodes 
are identical, Scenario 1, resulted in the lowest proportion of individuals evacuating.  
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Figure 1.  Proportion of Evacuated Nodes 
 
The trust differential introduces a measurement of how symmetric the trust relationships between individual nodes 
may be. A large trust differential would suggest possible occurrences of highly asymmetric trust relationships. In 
this case, the initial direction of message would have a potential impact on the overall effectiveness of the flow. 
Further analysis is needed to observe these dynamics. 
Comparisons of the trust scenarios are displayed in Figure 2. In Scenario 2, where nodes have higher trust in others 
of the same group, a larger trust differential results in a higher proportion of evacuated nodes. In Scenario 3, where 
nodes have higher trust in only nodes from group A, the larger trust differential does not have as great of an effect as 
observed in Scenario 2. 
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Figure 2.  Comparison of Scenarios 
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CONCLUSION 
The results presented are preliminary findings to explore the effects of variation in trust among the population. The 
basic scenarios introduce two groups of individual nodes. The social interactions between along with variables of 
trusts and perceived information values would bring about individuals to evacuate the network. A major assumption 
made is that after entering the believer state, the individual will attempt to propagate the warning information to 
members of its social network prior to evacuating. The findings bring upon an interesting observation on the effect 
of the trust differentials and the symmetry of the trusts. In certain situations, highly connected social communities 
may be preferable in message diffusion. The asymmetric trust relationships among individuals also have an 
interesting effect on message diffusion. These observations may have interesting implications for warnings belief 
and evacuation in heterogeneous multi-ethnic communities.  
Further work will be done to observe the effects of components such as trust variants in various sources, information 
value perceptions, and evacuation times. The use of multiple message sources will bring into effect how message 
information values incorporate together. An interesting matter would be the compare the effectiveness of sources 
with varying trustworthiness. The model axioms have dependencies on the initial social communication network, 
which abstractly describe how people communicate with each other. The message diffusion based on the axioms 
will vary accordingly to the defined network’s density and connectivity.  
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